Computing the Mind: From Cognitive Science to Philosophy of Mind

This thesis examines the integration of cognitive science theories into issues central to the philosophy of mind, particularly in its metaphysical aspects such as reduction, mental causation, intentionality, and consciousness. The reference paradigm for this work is computationalism, with a specific focus on how it addresses and manages these key philosophical themes. The thesis is divided into three chapters, followed by a concluding section. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical issues at stake and outlines the fundamental characteristics of various positions within the computationalist domain. It presents the theory of computability, developments in cognitive sciences, and artificial intelligence, while also addressing major criticisms typically raised against computationalist approaches. Chapter 2 delves into the philosophy of David Chalmers, whose work is particularly relevant for merging reflections in cognitive sciences with problems in the philosophy of mind. The chapter focuses on Chalmers’ proposal of minimal computationalism, which serves as a foundation for developing more comprehensive positions. It also explores themes related to Chalmers’ philosophy of mind, particularly his anti-reductionism, and its implications for cognitive sciences. Chapter 3 builds on the reflections of the previous chapters to propose a solid computational theory of mind within the philosophy of mind framework. This chapter moves away from Chalmers’ position, advocating for a naturalized yet non-reductive approach. It discusses issues related to the reduction of the mental and mental causation, introducing a structural analysis based on graph networks (i.e., mental causal topology) as the basis of mental states. Various metaphysical themes related to the mind are addressed, with an effort to avoid fully reducing the mental. The chapter concludes by outlining a possible computational account that could fulfill the tasks initially outlined, offering a clear development path for this account in relation to mental representation, mental content, intentionality, the language of thought, and consciousness.