Accordi internazionali sull'ambiente: Il processo UNFCCC è destinato al fallimento o ha la capacità di evolversi?

The UNFCCC process has arrived at an important turning point. By implementing the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC has switched from multilateralism to unilateralism. I explore how this change brings upon a different interpretation of the climate change problem and ask whether this change can lead to failure or to an evolution of the UNFCCC process. Using game theory, I first explain why climate change is a Prisoners' Dilemma and how can an optimal outcome be reached as an equilibrium in such a situation. I then analyze the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and illustrate why the multilateralist approach of Kyoto cannot fit the climate change problem as represented in the game-theoretical models. Afterwards I emphasize the alternative interpretation of climate change that the unilateral approach proposes. Finally, I consider alternative scenarios to the UNFCCC in the eventuality that the unilateralist approach does not meet the expectations.