In this dissertation pertaining to the field of moral psychology we treat three theories of human motivation: psychological egoism, psychological hedonism and psychological altruism. We do so with the aim of understanding if humans are capable of ultimately altruistic motivations, as opposed to what psychological egoism and psychological hedonism claim. In the first chapter, we provide a panoramic of the theories. We examine some meanings of “egoism”, “hedonism” and “altruism” not comprised by them, and we provide a quick historical overview of the support that the theories have received from antiquity until now. Afterwards, drawing from the many formulations they have received, we try to formulate the theories in the best and most defensible manner allowed by our capabilities. In doing so, we explore their claims and the notion of desire they employ more in depth. We also analyse how the theories are related to each other and to ethics, and subsequently what consequences may have embracing them. In the second chapter, we focus on the reasons that we could have for rejecting psychological altruism and holding psychological egoism or psychological hedonism. We start by examining the important role that internal rewards and the fallibility of introspection play for the possibility of defending the two latter theories, and we present some prima facie support for them. Afterwards, we examine various arguments that aim at supporting psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. We try to show how all of these arguments are flawed or inconclusive. In our third chapter, we provide an overview of the support for the possibility of ultimately altruistic motivations, against psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. While many arguments that we examine present various flaws, we believe that some of the reasons we analyse can provide important support for psychological altruism, and that the empirical evidence for ultimately altruistic motivation is convincing. We conclude that psychological altruism is the best theory of motivation of the three theories presented, and that there are probably good reasons to reject psychological egoism and psychological hedonism.

In this dissertation pertaining to the field of moral psychology we treat three theories of human motivation: psychological egoism, psychological hedonism and psychological altruism. We do so with the aim of understanding if humans are capable of ultimately altruistic motivations, as opposed to what psychological egoism and psychological hedonism claim. In the first chapter, we provide a panoramic of the theories. We examine some meanings of “egoism”, “hedonism” and “altruism” not comprised by them, and we provide a quick historical overview of the support that the theories have received from antiquity until now. Afterwards, drawing from the many formulations they have received, we try to formulate the theories in the best and most defensible manner allowed by our capabilities. In doing so, we explore their claims and the notion of desire they employ more in depth. We also analyse how the theories are related to each other and to ethics, and subsequently what consequences may have embracing them. In the second chapter, we focus on the reasons that we could have for rejecting psychological altruism and holding psychological egoism or psychological hedonism. We start by examining the important role that internal rewards and the fallibility of introspection play for the possibility of defending the two latter theories, and we present some prima facie support for them. Afterwards, we examine various arguments that aim at supporting psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. We try to show how all of these arguments are flawed or inconclusive. In our third chapter, we provide an overview of the support for the possibility of ultimately altruistic motivations, against psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. While many arguments that we examine present various flaws, we believe that some of the reasons we analyse can provide important support for psychological altruism, and that the empirical evidence for ultimately altruistic motivation is convincing. We conclude that psychological altruism is the best theory of motivation of the three theories presented, and that there are probably good reasons to reject psychological egoism and psychological hedonism.

Egoism, Hedonism and Altruism as Theories of Human Motivation

DEBERNARDI, MICHELE
2021/2022

Abstract

In this dissertation pertaining to the field of moral psychology we treat three theories of human motivation: psychological egoism, psychological hedonism and psychological altruism. We do so with the aim of understanding if humans are capable of ultimately altruistic motivations, as opposed to what psychological egoism and psychological hedonism claim. In the first chapter, we provide a panoramic of the theories. We examine some meanings of “egoism”, “hedonism” and “altruism” not comprised by them, and we provide a quick historical overview of the support that the theories have received from antiquity until now. Afterwards, drawing from the many formulations they have received, we try to formulate the theories in the best and most defensible manner allowed by our capabilities. In doing so, we explore their claims and the notion of desire they employ more in depth. We also analyse how the theories are related to each other and to ethics, and subsequently what consequences may have embracing them. In the second chapter, we focus on the reasons that we could have for rejecting psychological altruism and holding psychological egoism or psychological hedonism. We start by examining the important role that internal rewards and the fallibility of introspection play for the possibility of defending the two latter theories, and we present some prima facie support for them. Afterwards, we examine various arguments that aim at supporting psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. We try to show how all of these arguments are flawed or inconclusive. In our third chapter, we provide an overview of the support for the possibility of ultimately altruistic motivations, against psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. While many arguments that we examine present various flaws, we believe that some of the reasons we analyse can provide important support for psychological altruism, and that the empirical evidence for ultimately altruistic motivation is convincing. We conclude that psychological altruism is the best theory of motivation of the three theories presented, and that there are probably good reasons to reject psychological egoism and psychological hedonism.
ENG
In this dissertation pertaining to the field of moral psychology we treat three theories of human motivation: psychological egoism, psychological hedonism and psychological altruism. We do so with the aim of understanding if humans are capable of ultimately altruistic motivations, as opposed to what psychological egoism and psychological hedonism claim. In the first chapter, we provide a panoramic of the theories. We examine some meanings of “egoism”, “hedonism” and “altruism” not comprised by them, and we provide a quick historical overview of the support that the theories have received from antiquity until now. Afterwards, drawing from the many formulations they have received, we try to formulate the theories in the best and most defensible manner allowed by our capabilities. In doing so, we explore their claims and the notion of desire they employ more in depth. We also analyse how the theories are related to each other and to ethics, and subsequently what consequences may have embracing them. In the second chapter, we focus on the reasons that we could have for rejecting psychological altruism and holding psychological egoism or psychological hedonism. We start by examining the important role that internal rewards and the fallibility of introspection play for the possibility of defending the two latter theories, and we present some prima facie support for them. Afterwards, we examine various arguments that aim at supporting psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. We try to show how all of these arguments are flawed or inconclusive. In our third chapter, we provide an overview of the support for the possibility of ultimately altruistic motivations, against psychological egoism and psychological hedonism. While many arguments that we examine present various flaws, we believe that some of the reasons we analyse can provide important support for psychological altruism, and that the empirical evidence for ultimately altruistic motivation is convincing. We conclude that psychological altruism is the best theory of motivation of the three theories presented, and that there are probably good reasons to reject psychological egoism and psychological hedonism.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14240/85895