Il problema dell'intelletto nel Peripato pre-alessandrista: la riscoperta di un modello teorico

The present work reconstructs a Peripatetic theory of intellect developed in the post-Hellenistic period, as reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his De Intellectu. Moreover, this inquiry aims at a threefold goal: to demonstrate that these thinkers were proper exegetes of Aristotle’s works, and especially his De Anima; to prove that, despite the exegetical value of this operation, the philosophical worth of the Peripatetic theory itself is not jeopardized; and to show that this theory was crucial for both contemporary and later philosophers, and especially for the development of Alexander’s own theory of intellect (and, hence, of god). In so doing, the Peripatetic theory of the ‘intellect from without’ will emerge, revealing its efficient and effective nature, and its fundamental overlap with the Aristotelian ‘agent intellect’ of De Anima 3.5. A quite complex framework will come up eventually, a framework whose scope is not merely a psychological one, but rather addresses ontological, epistemological, and cosmological issues as well.