Defending Strong Alethic Pluralism

The thesis is concerned with strong alethic pluralism, according to which there are different alethic properties - each of which applicable to one domain of discourse - and there is no generic alethic property applicable to all domains. Usually, such a strong version of truth pluralism is taken to be inadequate from a logical point of view. Being logically inadequate, no truth theorist would take it as a serious contender. The goal of the thesis is to show that the position may have some plausibility, so as to make the position potentially palatable for a truth theorist. What is more, I want to argue that strong pluralism has some appealing advantages on its weak version. These general purposes are shaped into two parts. In the first chapter, I consider two challenges about logical operators and logical consequence, the challenge of mixed inferences and that of mixed compounds, and I propose a way to address them. The second chapter is about paradoxes. After presenting the problem of the liar paradox for pluralism, I briefly discuss the solutions provided to such a challenge. After showing that all solutions presented may be improved, I discuss a way to address the problem that extends to the case of pluralism the treatment of paradoxical sentences made by Saul Kripke (1975), showing that the assumption of partially defined alethic predicates may be a plausible way to defend the consistency of alethic pluralism.