Law and Reality: The perspective of the American Legal Realism on Judicial Decision-Making

Legal Realism, a transformative movement in modern jurisprudence, emerged in the early 20th century as a critique of legal formalism, challenging the notion of law as a rigid, self-contained system. It posited that law is a dynamic social construct shaped by human behavior, societal norms, and cultural contexts. Legal Realists, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn, emphasized the subjective nature of judicial decision-making and the importance of real-world outcomes over theoretical ideals. Scandinavian Legal Realists, like Axel Hägerström and Alf Ross, complemented this critique by grounding legal propositions in empirical realities. This thesis explores the enduring relevance of Legal Realism, focusing on its critique of objective justice and its emphasis on judicial discretion. The study integrates interdisciplinary perspectives from sociology, psychology, and economics to illustrate how Realist principles continue to influence legal theory and practice. The structure of the thesis includes: Chapter One: Introduction to American Legal Realism, its origins, philosophical foundations, interdisciplinary methodologies, and global connections, including comparisons with Scandinavian Legal Realism. Chapter Two: Examination of the critique of objective justice, emphasizing the lack of neutrality in legal systems, the role of judicial discretion, and the challenges and reforms associated with discretion. Chapter Three: A case study applying Legal Realist principles, analyzing the chosen case’s historical and legal significance, the role of discretion, and critiques of formalism. Scandinavian Legal Realism Chapter: Analyzes the context and contributions of Axel Hägerström and Alf Ross, comparing their ideas with American Legal Realism. The thesis reaffirms Legal Realism’s value as both a critique of formalism and a framework for achieving justice in a complex, interconnected world.