Reducing agency costs: legal strategies and the role of remuneration

This thesis analyzes the issue of agency costs and the legal strategies to mitigate them, with a particular focus on remuneration. In the first chapter, the agency theory is examined, from its origins to its most significant problems. It also described the relationship between the principal and the agent, which is characterized by conflicts of interest and the problem of informational asymmetries. The theme of agency costs arising from these conflicts is also analyzed in this chapter. The second chapter explores various legal strategies developed to reduce agency costs. The relationship between remuneration and agency theory is analyzed, too. In addition to it, there is a description about the way remuneration strategies are used to align the interests of agents with those of principals and to reduce agency costs. The third chapter describes the issue of ethics in remuneration, exploring the relationship between ethics and economics. It examines how ethical principles can be integrated into remuneration practices to promote more responsible and sustainable behavior by agents. The thesis concludes with a reflection on the role of remuneration and legal strategies in reducing agency costs, including the role of ethics in this context.