Divario di genere e l'impatto delle quote di genere nei consigli di amministrazione: il caso dell'Italia

In the last few years, many governments all around the world have introduced legislative actions in order to make progress in fighting low female representation on boardroom of directors. This affirmative action policy is based on the assumption that more balanced and diverse boards may lead to better result in governance and corporate performances. The economic literature about the effect of gender quotas is plenty of studies, but the empirical evidence is however inconclusive because of data and methodological limitations. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to single out the effect of quotas from other undetectable characteristics and the potential reverse causality may bias results. In Italy the law "Golfo-Mosca" (120/2011) sets mandatory gender quota for board of directors in both public and private listed companies. This law is a very important element for economic research because it introduces an exogenous shock in boardroom composition which may enable to overcome endogeneity problems that can bias the analysis. The purpose of this thesis is first, look at the main characteristics of gender gap, with emphasis on the quota of women in top management roles. Then explain some of the main motivation in support of the adoption of mandatory gender quotas and some critics. Finally, after explaining the characteristics of the law 120/2011 we will see results on the effect of quotas on board composition and corporate performances of Italian listed companies.