Età, informazione strategica e avanzamento professionale.

I use a one-period Bayesian game of information transmission to study the decision problem of a principal who needs to hire an expert. The expert's task consists in advising the principal on an investment decision. Potential advisors are heterogenous both in ability and in age. The behavior of young advisors differs from the behavior of the old ones in that the former are affected by the presence of career concerns, that is the desire to influence their future wage. On the one hand career concerns induce young advisors to increase the level of effort exerted while performing their task. On the other hand for the same reason young advisors might strategically conceal the information that they acquire. Both the level of commitment and the strategic behavior of young individuals will depend on their future expected revenue. The principal in equilibrium might prefer to hire a young or an old advisor depending on the workers' average level of skill and experience, as well as on the level of effort that the young workers exert in equilibrium.